GEORGIA TECH INFORMATION SECURITY CENTER

# GTISC Distinguished Lecture

**Wednesday, Sept. 10, 2008 • 3–4 p.m.**
**Technology Square Research Building (TSRB) Auditorium / Prefunction Area**

# Computerized Voting:
## Will you be able to vote?
## Will your vote be properly counted?

# Dr. Barbara Simons
## ACM Former President

### BIOGRAPHY

Barbara Simons, president of the Association of Computing Machinery (ACM) from July 1998 to June 2000, was recently appointed to the Board of Advisors of the federal Election Assistance Commission. She was a member of the National Workshop on Internet Voting that was convened at the request of President Clinton and produced a report on Internet Voting in 2001. Simons founded ACM's U.S. Public Policy Committee (USACM) in 1993 and served for many years as chair or co-chair of USACM. She is a fellow of ACM and the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and she was selected by C|NET as one of its 26 Internet "Visionaries" and by Open Computing as one of the "Top 100 Women in Computing." Simons earned her Ph.D. in computer science from the University of California, Berkeley. Her main areas of research have been compiler optimization, algorithm analysis and design, and scheduling theory. She is retired from IBM Research.


### ABSTRACT

Almost $4 billion in federal dollars, provided by the 2002 Help America Vote Act (HAVA), resulted in the initial widespread purchase of paperless computerized voting systems (Direct Recording Electronic or DREs) by many states, including Georgia. Election officials were told that DREs would be cheaper than alternative voting systems, a claim that ignored the costs of testing and secure storage, as well as very expensive annual maintenance contracts. They were told that DREs had been extensively tested and that the certification process guaranteed that the machines were reliable and secure. However, early independent security studies, followed by recent results from California's "Top-to-Bottom Review" have revealed that the DREs that were tested by California–all of which had been federally qualified and state certified–are poorly designed, badly programmed, insecure, unreliable and at times very difficult for people with disabilities to use. As a result, the California secretary of state decertified all of the tested systems, then recertified them with arduous conditions that had to be met.

This lecture will discuss some of the voting technologies that will be used in November, as well as national efforts to make our elections more secure and accurate through the use of voter-verified paper ballots. It also will review the situation in Georgia; because Georgia still uses paperless Diebold DREs, there will be no way to conduct an audit or recount of the November 2008 election in the state.


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